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LAW SUMMARY
Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising
Concerns of “Deepfake” Technology and Its
Influence on Democracy and the First
Amendment
Lindsey Wilkerson*

I. INTRODUCTION
“A video circulated that suggested that I was a pedophile. What do you
say to that? You go on Twitter and argue you’re not a pedophile? I mean,
there’s no excuse for that, no defense.”1 During the Obama Administration,
Michael McFaul served as the U.S. ambassador to Moscow. During his term,
he claimed he was the subject of Russian propaganda “[that] accused [him] of
plotting to overthrow leader Vladimir Putin as well as pedophilia.”2 In
February 2018, McFaul said an altered video was posted on YouTube falsely
showing him walking the streets of Moscow with a convicted pedophile.3
McFaul’s claims, if true, would be the first case of a government official
having their reputation attacked by “digitally constructed videos that can
*

Bachelors of Journalism, University of Missouri, 2019; J.D. Candidate, University of
Missouri School of Law, 2021; Associate Member, Missouri Law Review, 2019-2020.
I am grateful to Professor Wells for her insight, guidance, and support during the
writing of this summary, as well as the Missouri Law Review for its help in the editing
process.
1. This quote is from former U.S. Ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul when
he appeared on the CBC Radio show, “The Current.” The fight against ‘deepfake’
videos includes former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, CBC RADIO (July
20,
2018),
https://www.cbc.ca/radio/thecurrent/the-current-for-july-20-20181.4754632/the-fight-against-deepfake-videos-includes-former-u-s-ambassador-torussia-michael-mcfaul-1.4754674 [https://perma.cc/87N7-8974] [hereinafter “The
Current”].
2. Laura King & Sabra Ayres, What you need to know about Michael McFaul,
the ex-U.S. envoy drawn into the center of another Trump-Russia flap, L.A. TIMES
(July 19, 2018, 3:15 PM), https://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-russia-mcfaul20180719-story.html [https://perma.cc/QAL6-BFAN].
3. Michael McFaul, The Smear that Killed the ‘Reset’: Putin Needed an
American Enemy. He Picked Me.,
WASH. POST (May 11, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2018/05/11/feature/putinneeded-an-american-enemy-he-picked-me/ [https://perma.cc/4VAD-FQV5].
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make it appear that a person is saying or doing something they never did,”
also known as “deepfakes.”4
This Note explores how deepfake technology can disrupt democracy and
influence elections through the protections given to political speech under the
First Amendment. Part II describes deepfakes in greater detail and identifies
the wide uses for deepfake technology. Part III reflects on how the federal
government and states are attempting to regulate deepfakes, mainly to protect
individuals from pornographic exploitation and election tampering. Finally,
Part IV discusses in detail how the First Amendment creates constitutional
barriers in regulating deepfakes.

II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Deepfakes are a new and evolving form of technology that allow people
to make manipulated videos that can have potentially devastating impacts if
used in the wrong hands. While the technology behind deepfakes is complex,
the ability to make deepfakes is only becoming more accessible as time
passes. There are plenty of uses for deepfakes; they could jeopardize
individual privacy, fair elections, and perhaps democracy overall. But there
are some benefits from the use of deepfake technology, including the
promotion of self-expression – a hallmark of the First Amendment. Because
of this, deepfakes can be viewed through the lens of the First Amendment,
particularly parodies and the protection of lies.

A. What are “Deepfakes”?
Deepfakes – sometimes stylized as “deep fakes” or “deep-fakes” – are
videos that are digitally manipulated to make it look like a person “is
realistically saying or doing something they didn’t.”5 The new technology
has been spreading virally on the internet for various reasons, including
pornography and parody.6 Some political and legal experts are concerned,
however, about deepfake technology being used in the near future to tamper
with elections across the globe.7
4. The Current, supra note 1.
5. Benhamin Goggin, From porn to Game of Thrones: How deepfakes and
realistic-looking fake videos hit it big, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jun. 23, 2019, 9:45 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/deepfakes-explained-the-rise-of-fake-realisticvideos-online-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/BE7E-T464].
6. Id.; see also Cntl Shift Face, Better Call Trump: Money Laundering 101
[DeepFake],
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
18,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ho9h0ouemWQ
[https://perma.cc/HS9TRAGP] (showing a deepfake of President Donald Trump as one of the characters in a
well-known scene in the TV show “Breaking Bad”).
7. Grace Shao, Fake videos could be the next big problem in the 2020 elections,
CNBC (Jan. 17, 2020, 2:49 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/15/deepfakescould-be-problem-for-the-2020-election.html
[https://perma.cc/KM5V-39DY]
(quoting John Villasenor, a professor at UCLA focusing on artificial intelligence and
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Deepfake technology has its roots in pornography; it gained popularity
in 2017 when lewd videos surfaced showing celebrity faces on pornographic
actors and actresses.8 The number of deepfakes online doubled between 2018
and 2019.9 With the increasing prominence of deepfakes, “some of the most
influential people in the world, and their audiences, have become targets of
deepfakers.”10 The first viral deepfake was a pornographic video that featured
Wonder Woman lead actress Gal Gadot’s face digitally transplanted on top of
the face of an actual pornographic actress.11 The video was first posted on the
social media website Reddit by a user named “deepfakes,” thus coining the
title “deepfake” for these types of videos.12 Deepfakes can be freakishly
realistic since they are “trained on hours of footage, [and have] been
specifically generated for its context, with seamless mouth and head
movements and appropriate coloration.”13 As technology has progressed,
deepfakes have become easier to create since anyone with “a computer,
internet access, and interest in influencing an election” can make one.14 Some
apps have even been developed that allow smartphone users to create
deepfakes at the touch of their fingertips.15

cybersecurity); Danielle Citron, How deepfakes undermine truth and threaten
democracy,
TED,
https://www.ted.com/talks/danielle_citron_how_deepfakes_undermine_truth_and_th
reaten_democracy/transcript?utm_source=twitter.com&utm_medium=social&utm_c
ampaign=tedspread [https://perma.cc/VYQ4-3BLV] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020).
8. Goggin, supra note 5.
9. HENRY AJDER ET. AL, DEEPTRACE, THE STATE OF DEEPFAKES: LANDSCAPE,
THREATS, AND IMPACT, 1 (SEPT. 2019). Deeptrace, the organization behind this report,
started as a way to understand, research, and identify deepfakes. Id.
10. Goggin, supra note 5.
11. Samantha Cole, AI-Assisted Fake Porn Is Here and We’re All F*****d, VICE
(Dec. 11, 2017, 1:18 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/gydydm/gal-gadotfake-ai-porn [https://perma.cc/GR9C-9QNW] (The title of this article has been edited
to remove profane language).
12. Goggin, supra note 5.
13. Id.; see also Supasorn Suwajanakorn, Synthesizing Obama: Learning Lip
Sync
from
Audio,
YOUTUBE
(July
11,
2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Yq67CjDqvw [https://perma.cc/GR9C-9QNW]
(showing a step-by-step process used by University of Washington research students
to make a deepfake of President Barack Obama).
14. Shao, supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., Ivan Mehta, New Deepfake App Pastes Your Face onto GIFs in
Seconds, NEXT WEB (Jan. 13, 2020, 5:04 AM), https://thenextweb.com/artificialintelligence/2020/01/13/new-deepfake-app-pastes-your-face-onto-gifs-in-seconds/
[https://perma.cc/E4CV-DEB5]; Zak Doffman, Chinese Deepfake App ZAO Goes
Viral, Privacy Of Millions ‘At Risk’, FORBES (Sept. 2, 2019, 4:27 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zakdoffman/2019/09/02/chinese-best-ever-deepfakeapp-zao-sparks-huge-faceapp-like-privacy-storm/#61486e068470
[https://perma.cc/92D9-ENVZ].
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B. What are the Main Uses and Threats of Deepfakes?
While deepfakes originated in the pornography industry, there are
growing concerns about how they could interfere with politics and elections
and threaten individual privacy. Maybe it is not surprising that with the
growth and general accessibility of any video-editing software, the “Average
Joe” is able to manipulate videos in order to create a false perception of
another person.16 Perhaps what is more disturbing, however, is the reaction
and confusion that these altered videos can create.17 This Part discusses the
threats to democracy, elections, and individual privacy that deepfakes may
cause, while also noting how they can be protected from regulation by
arguments for creative freedom and self-expression.

1. Threats to Democracy and Elections
Deepfakes could potentially change the political sphere, spin elections,
and increase the dissemination of “fake news.” Deepfakes have been
described by some as “a powerful new tool for those who might want to (use)
misinformation to influence an election.”18 One possible example of this was
provided by privacy law scholar Danielle Citron at a TED Talk about
deepfakes.19 She described a hypothetical where, the night before an election,
a deepfake spreads online showing one of the major party candidates had
fallen ill.20 Citron claimed that the deepfake “could tip the election and shake
our sense that elections are legitimate.”21 When placed in the wrong hands,
“deepfakes have the potential to corrode the trust that we have in democratic
institutions.”22
Citron is not the only scholar worried about this problem; in fact, news
outlets like CNBC and The Guardian have reported the same concerns.23
They compare the spread of deepfakes to the threat of fake news in the 2016
16. Drew Harwell, Faked Pelosi Videos, Slowed to Make Her Appear Drunk,
Spread Across Social Media, WASH. POST (May 23, 2019 3:41 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/23/faked-pelosi-videosslowed-make-her-appear-drunk-spread-across-social-media/
[https://perma.cc/UX2L-RJKL] (discussing how an altered video of House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi, which made it appear like she was “drunkenly slurring her words,”
created confusion and prompted ridicule online).
17. Id. (same).
18. Shao, supra note 7 (quoting John Villasenor, a professor at UCLA focusing
on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity).
19. Citron, supra note 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Shao, supra note 7; Oscar Schwartz, You Thought Fake News Was Bad? Deep
Fakes Are Where Truth Goes to Die, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2018, 5:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/nov/12/deep-fakes-fake-news-truth
[https://perma.cc/EEK8-8B8T].

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol86/iss1/12

4

Wilkerson: Still Waters Run Deep(fakes): The Rising Concerns of “Deepfake” T

2021] DEEPFAKES, DEMOCRACY, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

411

election.24 In response to this, social media websites are making policy
changes to prevent the spread of deepfakes, especially after the criticisms
about the increase of fake news.25 For example, leading up to the 2020
election and census, YouTube announced that it would not “allow electionrelated ‘deepfake’ videos and anything that aims to mislead viewers about
voting procedures and how to participate in the 2020 census.”26
Other social media websites have also established limitations to
publishing deepfakes, but their limitations seem to be focused more on
limiting the spread of misinformation and “fake news,” rather than election
tampering. Facebook first put out a statement that it had “strengthen[ed]” its
policies “toward misleading manipulated videos that have been identified as
deepfakes” in response to growing concerns about the dominance of its
presence online.27 Some news outlets interpreted this statement as Facebook’s
commitment to completely ban deepfakes from its website.28 Similarly,
Reddit has terminated some forums that were previously started by users to
share deepfakes in an effort to stop the spread of deepfakes on its website.29
On a broader scale, Twitter and Pornhub have completely banned the
publication of deepfakes on their websites.30
While these policies are sometimes labeled as a ban, it is possible that
some “loopholes” may exist around them.31 For example, Facebook’s
24. Shao, supra note 7; Schwartz, supra note 23.
25. See Dave Lee, Matter of Fact-Checkers: Is Facebook Winning the Fake News
War?, BBC (April 2, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-47779782
[https://perma.cc/HRU2-MSJ6] (showing that people “felt Facebook was not listening
to their feedback on how to improve the tool it provides to sift through content flagged
as ‘fake news.’”).
26. Matt O’Brien, YouTube: No ‘Deepfakes’ or ‘Birther’ Videos in 2020
PRESS
(Feb.
2,
2020),
Election,
ASSOCIATED
https://apnews.com/3397d5dec4972ce12cac5037eeb9f226 [https://perma.cc/8YRJL8VQ] .
27. Monika Bickert, Enforcing Against Manipulated Media, FACEBOOK (Jan. 6,
2020),
https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/enforcing-against-manipulated-media/
[https://perma.cc/8DPL-U5EH].
28. David McCabe & Davey Alba, Facebook Says It Will Ban ‘Deepfakes’, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/07/technology/facebooksays-it-will-ban-deepfakes.html [https://perma.cc/X7CA-UVSG].
29. r/deepfakes,
REDDIT,
https://www.reddit.com/r/deepfakes
[https://perma.cc/7PFC-3NU8] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (showing that this
subreddit was banned); r/celebfakes, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com/r/Celebfakes/
[https://perma.cc/7XUP-K2FV] (last visited Feb. 12, 2020) (same).
30. Samantha Cole, Twitter Is the Latest Platform to Ban AI Generated Porn,
VICE (Feb. 6, 2018, 5:12 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/ywqgab/twitterbans-deepfakes [https://perma.cc/CJ7U-FPUW].
31. See Betsy Morris, Facebook Bans Deepfakes but Permits Some Altered
Content,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
7,
2020,
5:33
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebooks-deepfake-video-ban-permits-some-alteredcontent-11578384519 [https://perma.cc/2WSM-NEBU]; Aaron Holmes, Facebook
Just Banned Deepfakes, but the Policy Has Loopholes — and a Widely Circulated

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,

5

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 86, Iss. 1 [], Art. 12

412

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

deepfake policy has exceptions for “deepfakes meant as satire as well as
misleading videos made with less sophisticated tools.”32 Under the First
Amendment, this tracks with case law about parody speech.33 However, in
the fight against “fake news,” this policy may be troubling to individuals
concerned about the spread of false information.34
At the heart of the election tampering and “fake news” concerns rest the
overall worries about generalized harm to society, including distortion of
democratic discourse, eroding trust in institutions and journalism, increasing
social divisions, and threats to national security.35 Before the 2020
presidential election, there were concerns that deepfakes would be “prevalent
and problematic.”36 While deepfakes were certainly circulated during the
2020 election season,37 later reports dated closer to the election suggested that
the concern over deepfake election tampering was overhyped.38 Outside of
elections, politicians on both sides of the aisle have worried about how
deepfakes could threaten national security, suggesting deepfakes are a
“conceivable political weapon.”39 Diplomats and ambassadors have claimed
that they have been the target of deepfakes.40 Some scholars have warned
about the “Liar’s Dividend,” a term coined for the potential phenomenon that
public figures may start claiming their missteps were actually fake news,
publicized through a deepfake, rather than a truthful statement.41

Deepfake of Mark Zuckerberg Is Allowed to Stay Up, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 7, 2020,
10:07 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-just-banned-deepfakes-butthe-policy-has-loopholes-2020-1 [https://perma.cc/4TK4-REM8].
32. Holmes, supra note 31.
33. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of
the First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow
of ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”).
34. Holmes, supra note 31 (“‘Facebook wants you to think the problem is videoediting technology, but the real problem is Facebook’s refusal to stop the spread of
disinformation.’”).
35. Bobby Chesney & Danielle Citron, Deep Fakes: A Looming Challenge for
Privacy, Democracy, and National Security, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 1753, 1771–86
(2019).
36. Holly Kathleen Hall, Deepfake Videos: When Seeing Isn’t Believing, 27
CATH. U.J.L. & TECH. 51, 59 (2018).
37. David Frum, The Very Real Threat of Trump’s Deepfake, THE ATLANTIC
(April 27, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/trumps-firstdeepfake/610750/ [https://perma.cc/J9CP-S2XH] (showing that President Donald
Trump reposted deepfake of his opponent, Joe Biden, on Twitter).
38. Tim Mak & Dina Temple-Raston, Where Are The Deepfakes In This
NEWS
(Oct.
1,
2020),
Presidential
Election?,
NPR
https://www.npr.org/2020/10/01/918223033/where-are-the-deepfakes-in-thispresidential-election [https://perma.cc/53RT-TANS].
39. Hall, supra note 36, at 59.
40. Id. at 60; see McFaul, supra note 3.
41. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1785.
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2. Threats to Individual Privacy
Some legal experts are also concerned with the use of deepfakes to harm
individuals, either through exploitation or sabotage.42 Examples of
exploitation purposes could include, but are not limited to, financial
blackmail, revenge porn, and possibly even “fraudulent kidnapping claims.”43
Deepfake revenge porn seems to be considered the most prominent concern
in this category.44 Revenge porn – the dissemination of pornographic videos
or photos without the subject’s consent or knowledge – could be transformed
into a new beast by using deepfake technology.45 Now, a person could be the
subject of a porn video without having even performed the sex act being
showcased in the video.46

3. The Defense of Deepfakes: Self-Expression
But while critics have been quick to bring up various problems with
deepfakes, it is important to acknowledge that there could be some benefits to
the new technology – mainly its ability to promote self-expression.47 For
example, there is some evidence that deepfake technology could be used to
alter audio files and “restore the ability of persons suffering from certain forms
of paralysis, such as ALS, to speak with their own voice.”48 Additionally,
comedic parody deepfakes could be considered self-expression.49 One
YouTube channel dedicated to this purpose, Cntl Shift Face, has already
garnered more than 300,000 subscribers since it started publishing deepfakes

42. Id. at 1772–75; see Citron, supra note 7.
43. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1772–73.
44. Rebecca A. Delfino, Pornographic Deepfakes: The Case for Federal
Criminalization of Revenge Porn’s Next Tragic Act, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 925
(2019) (“Immediately after celebrity-based pornographic deepfakes emerged in late
2017 and went viral on the internet, legal scholars and journalists raised the alarm that
this conduct implicated the First Amendment protections afforded to online content.”);
see Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1773.
45. Delfino, supra note 44, at 891.
46. Id. (“Because deepfake technology can be used to create realistic
pornographic videos without the consent of the individuals depicted, and since these
videos can be broadly distributed on the internet, pornographic deepfakes exist in the
realm of other sexually exploitative cybercrimes such as revenge porn and
nonconsensual pornography.”).
47. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1770; see also Jessica Silbey &
Woodrow Hartzog, The Upside of Deep Fakes, 78 MD. L. REV. 960, 966 (2019).
48. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1771
49. Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6. (showing a deepfake of President Donald
Trump as one of the characters in a well-known scene in the TV show “Breaking
Bad”).
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in 2019.50 Deepfake parody videos usually consist of an actor or celebrity
deepfaked into different context than normally expected, aimed at a comedic
or entertaining purpose.51 For example, in Cntl Shift Face’s most popular
video on YouTube, titled “Bill Hader impersonates Arnold Schwarzenegger
[DeepFake],” actor Bill Hader is pictured on a late-night talk show speaking
to the show’s host, Conan O’Brien.52 When Hader begins to impersonate
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s recognizable accent as part of a joke, Cntl Shift
Face slowly morphs Hader’s face into Schwarzenegger’s.53 Videos like the
one described tend to go viral online, spread through various different social
media platforms, like YouTube and Instagram, for example.54

C. Applicable First Amendment Law
This Note specifically focuses on how deepfakes could be viewed under
the First Amendment. Depending on the content and the situation of which it
arises, deepfakes could be viewed under several different branches of the First
Amendment. First, the deepfaker could claim that the video was a political
parody. Second, the deepfaker could argue that the First Amendment
generally protects lies. Lastly, if the deepfake includes pornographic images,
it might be covered under obscenity, child porn, or revenge porn law.

1. Politics, Parodies, and Privacy
Not all uses of deepfakes are villainous; in fact, many people claim to
use the technology to comment on politics and poke fun at governmental

50. Cntl Shift Face, YOUTUBE (last visited April 11, 2020),
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCKpH0CKltc73e4wh0_pgL3g
[https://perma.cc/Z3PK-ERCF].
51. See, e.g., Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6; Cntl Shift Face, Jim Carrey DeepFake
[VFX
Comparison],
YOUTUBE
(Sept.
3,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JbzVhzNaTdI [https://perma.cc/4DLV-WAK5]
(showing a deepfake of Jim Carrey taking the place of Jack Nicholson’s role in The
Shining); Collider Videos, Deepfake Roundtable: Cruise, Downey Jr., Lucas & More
- The Streaming Wars | Above the Line, YOUTUBE (Nov. 11, 2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_6Tumd8EQI [https://perma.cc/2XA6-3Z92]
(showing a roundtable of “celebrities” that are actually impersonators with deepfaked
faces of celebrities).
52. Cntl Shift Face, Bill Hader impersonates Arnold Schwarzenegger
[DeepFake],
YOUTUBE
(May
10,
2019),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bPhUhypV27w
[https://perma.cc/66NHRUBU].
53. Id.
54. Collider Videos, supra note 51; @bill_posters_uk, INSTAGRAM (June 7,
2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/ByaVigGFP2U/ (showing a deepfake of Mark
Zuckerberg with more than 120,000 views).
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officials.55 Because of this, it is likely that these deepfakes could be protected
under the First Amendment if they are classified as parodies.56 It is important
to note that the First Amendment itself, which establishes that “Congress shall
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” applies only to
governmental regulation of speech.57 It does not apply to private parties.58
So, privately owned social media websites like Facebook and Twitter have
the ability to remove or block deepfakes from being posted on their platforms
without violating the First Amendment rights of social media users.59
Parodies are “an attack on folly” and generally imitate an existing work
for some comedic purpose.60 Parodies are definitely not new; “[f]rom the
early cartoon portraying George Washington as an ass down to the present
day, graphic depictions and satirical cartoons have played a prominent role in
public and political debate.”61 Parodies are tied closely with political
speech,62 and under the First Amendment, political speech is given a
significant amount of deference by courts.63
There is no question that government officials, who are often the subjects
of these political parodies, are considered “public figures” under the law.64
This means they can often be subjected to “vehement, caustic, and sometimes
55. See e.g., Cntl Shift Face, supra note 6 (showing a deepfake of President
Donald Trump as one of the characters in a well-known scene in the TV show
“Breaking Bad”).
56. See Holmes, supra note 31.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
58. Lata Nott, Is your speech protected by the First Amendment?, FREEDOM
FORUM
INSTITUTE,
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendmentcenter/primers/basics/ [https://perma.cc/ZV43-BDJJ] (last visited Nov. 4, 2020)
(outlining what the First Amendment protects).
59. See Sara Fischer & Ashley Gold, All the platforms that have banned or
restricted Trump so far, AXIOS, https://www.axios.com/platforms-social-media-banrestrict-trump-d9e44f3c-8366-4ba9-a8a1-7f3114f920f1.html
[https://perma.cc/86XT-4925] (Jan. 11, 2021) (showing that many social media
companies banned former President Donald Trump from their platforms because he
violated the websites’ policies and guidelines). See also Rich Barlow, Break Up
Twitter? Or Ban Trump? Where Does Social Media Go from Here?, BU TODAY,
http://www.bu.edu/articles/2021/trump-banned-on-social-media-not-firstamendment-issue/ [https://perma.cc/6ZL5-TC5K] (Jan. 11, 2021) (showing that social
media companies, like Twitter, can ban users from using its website when they do not
comply with the website’s conditions).
60. Kyonzte Hughes, Parody & Satire, FREEDOM FORUM INSTITUTE (Sept. 13,
2002),
https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendmentcenter/topics/freedom-of-speech-2/arts-first-amendment-overview/parody-satire/
[https://perma.cc/S7AT-VRVR].
61. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54 (1988).
62. Id.
63. Stromberg v. People of State of Cal., 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931) (“The
maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a fundamental
principle of our constitutional system.”).
64. See, e.g. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964).
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unpleasantly sharp attacks.”65 The landmark parody case involving a public
figure is Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, in which a well-known minister sued
the magazine for emotional distress after a parody piece depicted him as an
incestuous drunk.66 The United States Supreme Court noted that the nature
of parodies is that they are “not reasoned or evenhanded, but slashing and onesided.”67
Generally, to bring a tort claim, a public figure would need to prove the
“speech could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts.”68
For libel and emotional distress cases, the public figure would also need to
show that “the publication contains a false statement of fact which was made
with ‘actual malice,’ i.e., with knowledge that the statement was false or with
reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true.”69 New York Times v.
Sullivan initially created the “actual malice” test for public officials’ libel
claims,70 and Falwell extended it to emotional distress cases.71 The actual
malice standard has been described in more detail as “a constitutional rule that
allows public figures to recover for libel or defamation only when they can
prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with
the requisite level of culpability.”72 So, in applying this analysis to deepfakes,
if President Donald Trump wanted to sue the creator of a deepfake parody
made about him, for example, he would have to demonstrate that the deepfake
could be reasonably believed as truthful, in addition to proving that the
deepfaker had “actual malice” in creating and publishing the deepfake online.
Similarly to the libel and emotional distress cases involving parodies, a
victim of deepfakes would also have a difficult time bringing a false light
privacy claim due to the “actual malice” standard for public figures.73 A claim
for false light privacy can be brought when a person has given “publicity to a
matter concerning another that places the other before the public in a false
light.”74 The standard used for determining false light privacy claims is based
upon whether the perception given to the person is “offensive to a reasonable
65. Id. at 270. It is important to note that ordinary individuals – those that are not
public figures – do not have to meet the actual malice requirement. Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
66. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 48 (1988).
67. Id. at 54.
68. Id. at 50.
69. Id. at 56.
70. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
71. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 56.
72. Id. at 52 (emphasis added).
73. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (holding that a magazine
publisher could not be held liable “in the absence of proof that the defendant published
the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.”); Douglas
Harris, Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You, 17
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 99, 115 (2019); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (AM.
LAW INST. 1977) (showing that a victim must prove that the offender knew or
recklessly regarded the fact that the information is false).
74. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652E (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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person.”75 It would not be an easy task to prove a false light privacy case
against a deepfaker, especially since the victim would need to prove that other
people actually recognized that the deepfake truly put them in a “false light.”76
This means that the public would have to understand that the deepfake was
false and that it negatively portrayed the victim through its falsity.

2. The First Amendment’s Protection of Lies
On the surface, the entire point of deepfakes is to spread lies – the videos
show people in circumstances or positions that are simply untrue, regardless
of the deepfaker’s intent. The Supreme Court has been consistent in saying
that “there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.”77 However,
generally, the First Amendment still protects some lies.78 This stance
“comports with the common understanding that some false statements are
inevitable if there is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public
and private conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to
guarantee.”79 Lies about the government and its officials, since they relate to
political speech, may be protected under this rationale as well.80
Regardless, there remains the availability of criminal and civil liability
– like libel and slander – to punish the speaker for their lies depending on the
speaker’s culpability, position as a public figure, and the subject matter of the
speech.81 However, if the questionable deepfake does not fall under one of
these existing exceptions, the Supreme Court has suggested that the
truthfulness of speech will generally be revealed through the marketplace of
ideas.82 The reliance on the traditional “marketplace of ideas” concept in
regards to deepfakes is shaky, however, if the deepfake is particularly

75. See id.
76. Harris, supra note 73, at 117.
77. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
78. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012) (“Absent from those few
categories where the law allows content-based regulation of speech is any general
exception to the First Amendment for false statements.”).
79. Id.
80. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
81. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 763
(1985) (showing that “actual malice” is not required if the speech is not related to a
subject of “public concern”); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974)
(showing that the “actual malice” standard does not apply to standard individuals);
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (showing that the First Amendment
does not protect speech that incites “imminent lawless action”); Chaplinsky v. State
of New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942) (showing that the First Amendment
does not protect “fighting words”).
82. Alvarez, 567 U.S. at 727–728 (“The remedy for speech that is false is speech
that is true. . . . The theory of our Constitution is ‘that the best test of truth is the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.’”).
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convincing, misleading, and deceptive.83 A deepfake could be so realistic that
the truth may never prevail unless there is some intervention, either through
private website owners or by the government.84

3. Obscenity, Child Porn, or Revenge Porn?
Similarly, victims of sexually explicit deepfakes would also have a
difficult time proving the deepfake was a form of revenge porn. The First
Amendment recognizes exceptions for obscenity and child pornography –
generally, pornography cannot be banned unless it is obscene.85 Therefore,
the status quo of the law makes it difficult to sue for revenge porn unless there
is an applicable state statute specifically prohibiting it or the case includes
unlawful child pornography.86 The Supreme Court outlined a three-pronged
test for obscenity cases not involving children in Miller v. California to
determine if the pornographic content had value outside of its obscenity: (1)
if “‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest,” (2)
“whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law,” and (3) “whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.”87 Proving the first and third prongs in court would likely be left to
case-by-case analyses based upon the “reasonable person” standard.
However, if states continue to regulate deepfakes under their statutes – as
described in more detail in Part III, Subpart B – it may be easier to meet the
second Miller test requirements, as it could make it easier to find the
“applicable state law.”
Additionally, some courts have already started discussions on how
deepfakes will impact future child pornography cases.88 While wide bans of
83. See Hall, supra note 36, at 52–53 (“In the past we have relied on the
‘marketplace of ideas’ concept, which encourages more speech as a means to uncover
the truth and have the best ideas rise to the fore, rather than censor particular content.
Is this argument still valid when the public cannot discern what information is true,
misleading, or false?”).
84. At the time of this Note, there are no laws in place that would prohibit social
media websites like Facebook or Twitter from removing deepfakes on their platforms,
unlike how the First Amendment could prohibit the government from doing the same.
85. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 240 (2002).
86. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764 (1982) (showing there is no First
Amendment protection for child pornography and outlining a specific test for any
exceptions); see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019) (showing California’s
revenge porn statute).
87. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
88. See In re S.K., 215 A.3d 300, 315 n.22 (2019); United States v. Streett, No.
CR 14-3609 JB, 2020 WL 231688, at *47 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 2020). The focus on
child pornography is likely because children are particularly vulnerable. See Ferber,
458 U.S. at 764 (showing that “kiddie porn” is not protected under the First
Amendment).
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child pornography have not been upheld under the First Amendment,89 states
are generally given discretion and leniency in how much they choose to
regulate child pornography.90 In New York v. Ferber, the Supreme Court
announced a stricter standard than Miller in deciding child pornography cases.
To be unlawful, the child pornography does not require a “prurient interest of
the average person.”91 The sexual conduct shown also does not need to be
portrayed in “a patently offensive manner,” and the material does not need to
be considered in its entirety.92
Lastly, if the deepfake is just a form of porn – meaning it does not include
sexually explicit imagery of children and is found to not be obscene – there is
no remaining way to regulate it under the First Amendment.93 If a state has
passed a revenge porn statute, however, then it is possible that the deepfake
and its creator could be penalized under that law. Most states have created
revenge porn statutes relying on privacy concerns and worries about
intentional infliction of emotional distress.94 Many of these statutes now
include language about deepfakes.95

III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It is not a simple task to protect individual rights and bolster democracy
against threats from malicious deepfakes, some action has taken place by the
federal and state government. Subpart A discusses how some federal
legislation has been tossed around the House and Senate proposing to regulate
deepfakes, but most attempts have been futile. However, Subpart B
demonstrates that some states have successfully crafted and passed legislation
to control deepfakes pertaining to election tampering and obscenity.

A. The Push and Stall in Federal Intervention
At the time of this Note, there have been numerous Congressional
attempts to regulate deepfakes; only one of them has succeeded in being
signed into law.96 This Part explores four leading pieces of legislation that

89. Ashcroft, 535 U.S. at 258.
90. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756.
91. Id. at 764.
92. Id.
93. See Delfino, supra note 44, at 925 (pointing to obscenity as one of the only
First Amendment claims to make regarding pornographic deepfakes).
94. 46 States + DC + One Territory NOW have Revenge Porn Laws, CYBER
CIVIL
RIGHTS
INITIATIVE
(last
visited
April
12,
2020),
https://www.cybercivilrights.org/revenge-porn-laws/ [https://perma.cc/Z2DP-BS9H].
95. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(2) (West 2019); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019).
96. NDAA for FY 2020, S.1790, Pub. L. No. 116-92, § 5709, 133 Stat. 1198,
2168 (2019).
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members of Congress have put forward regarding deepfakes, which are all
aimed at preventing federal political interference.

1. Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018
The first federal bill targeting deepfakes, the “Malicious Deep Fake
Prohibition Act of 2018,” was introduced by Senator Ben Sasse (R-Neb.) in
December 2018.97 The bill was read twice and sent to committee, but that is
the farthest it went.98 This is probably due to the ambitious nature of the bill,
which, if passed, would have created a “new criminal offense related to the
creation or distribution of fake electronic media records that appear
realistic.”99 The bill was relatively short, just including sections for
definitions, offenses, and exceptions.100 The intent or the actual distribution
of a deepfake would have been against federal law if the deepfaker had “actual
knowledge that the audiovisual record is a deep fake” and still distributed it
anyway.101 The Act would have subjected convicted deepfakers to no more
than two years in prison, unless the deepfake was found to “facilitate
violence” or “affect the conduct” of government or election proceedings.102
Interestingly, the bill had a limitation that “[n]o person shall be held liable
under this section for any activity protected by the First Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.”103

2. DEEP FAKES Accountability Act
About six months after the Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018
was introduced, the “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act” surfaced in the
House, led by Representative Yvette D. Clarke (D-NY).104 Representative
Clarke had twenty-eight co-sponsors on the bill; all of them were members of
the Democratic Party.105 The Act was noticeably longer than the Malicious

97. Malicious Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, S. 3805, 115th Cong. 2d Sess.
(2018).
98. Actions Overview S.3805 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/3805/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/WGY4-Y94Q].
99. Summary: S.3805 – 115th Congress (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV (last
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senatebill/3805.
100. S. 3805.
101. S. 3805 § 1041(b)(1)–(2).
102. S. 3805, § 1041(c)(1)–(2).
103. S. 3805, § 1041(d)(2).
104. Defending Each and Every Person from False Appearances by Keeping
Exploitation Subject to Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 3230, 116th Cong. 1st Sess.
(2019) [hereinafter “DEEP FAKES Accountability Act”].
105. Cosponsors: H.R.3230 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
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Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, and it covered more aspects. For
example, the Act discussed digital watermarking deepfake videos so they
would be more identifiable, plus requiring “clearly articulated” video and
audio disclosures to show that the deepfakes were altered videos.106
The Act also allowed for both criminal and civil penalties for failure to
disclose that the videos were altered.107 The Act covered deepfakes with the
“intent of influencing a domestic public policy debate” and “interfering in a
Federal, State, local, or territorial election. . .”108 Compared to the Malicious
Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018, the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act
carried a larger criminal sentence of up to five years.109 For private actions,
damage amounts were outlined, ranging from $50,000 to $150,000 for each
violative deepfake.110 Injunctive relief was also described as a private action
remedy.111
Another interesting part of this Act is the creation of several task forces
and coordinators to help enforce the Act. First, the Act dedicated a section to
victim assistance, specifically tasking the Attorney General to place “a
coordinator in each United States Attorney’s Office to receive reports from
the public regarding potential violations . . . relating to deep fake depictions
produced or distributed by any foreign nation-state . . . and coordinate
prosecutions for any violation of such section.”112 This section was likely
aimed at preventing the spread of deepfake revenge porn.113 Similarly, the
Act would have created a “Deep Fakes Task Force” within the Department of
Homeland Security to help “combat the national security implications of deep
fakes.”114
The DEEP FAKES Accountability Act was referred to several
committees in June 2019, but it was effectively tabled by the Subcommittee
on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security just a few weeks after its initial
introduction on the House floor.115 The Act covered a lot of information and
had “enormous loopholes,” which may have caused its demise.116 The Act
bill/3230/cosponsors?searchResultViewType=expanded&KWICView=false
[https://perma.cc/8BKN-QH4R].
106. H.R. 3230, § 1041(a)–(e).
107. Id. at § 1041(f).
108. Id. at § 1041(f)(1)(B)(iv).
109. Id. at § 1041(f).
110. Id. at § 1041(g)(2).
111. Id. at § 1041(g)(3).
112. Id. at § 1042(a).
113. See Devin Coldewey, DEEPFAKES Accountability Act would impose
unenforceable rules — but it’s a start, TECHCRUNCH (June 13, 2019),
https://techcrunch.com/2019/06/13/deepfakes-accountability-act-would-imposeunenforceable-rules-but-its-a-start/ [https://perma.cc/9586-9NNU].
114. H.R. 3230, § 918 sec. 7 (a).
115. All Actions H.R.3230 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/housebill/3230/all-actions [https://perma.cc/9586-9NNU].
116. See Coldewey, supra note 113.
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was criticized by deepfake regulation activists and critics alike; some said the
Act was overly broad and threatened individuals’ First Amendment
protections, and others said there were too many exceptions to where it could
not be effective in preventing the spread of deepfakes.117

3. Deepfake Report Act of 2019
Just a month after the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act, the “Deepfake
Report Act of 2019” was introduced by Senator Rob Portman (R-Ohio).118
The House sent the Act to a subcommittee in October 2019 but never
reconsidered it.119 The Act would have required “the Department of
Homeland Security to report at specified intervals on the state of digital
content forgery technology.”120 This Act reached farther than just deepfakes;
according to the Act’s summary, “digital content forgery” includes all
“artificial intelligence and machine learning techniques, to fabricate or
manipulate audio, visual, or text content with the intent to mislead.”121 The
Deepfake Report Act is similar in some way to its predecessor, the Malicious
Deep Fake Prohibition Act of 2018. It is much shorter and narrower in scope
than the DEEP FAKES Accountability Act.122 The Deepfake Report Act only
required the Department of Homeland Security to “produce a report on the
state of digital content forgery technology” and conduct relevant public
hearings to gather more information about the topic.123 Media coverage at the
time of this Act’s introduction was limited, so it is uncertain why this Act
specifically failed.

4. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
The omnibus National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
(“NDAA for FY 2020”) is the only successfully passed legislation so far
regarding deepfakes.124 The Act is lengthy and complex, but one section is
dedicated to a “report on deepfake technology, foreign weaponization of
117. See Mathew Ingram, Legislation aimed at stopping deepfakes is a bad idea,
COLUM. JOURNALISM REV. (July 1, 2019), https://www.cjr.org/analysis/legislationdeepfakes.php [https://perma.cc/N2PX-46TS].
118. S.2065 – Deepfake Report Act of 2019, CONGRESS.GOV (last visited Mar. 13,
2020),
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/2065
[https://perma.cc/QRS4-YJML].
119. Actions Overview S.2065 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV
(last visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/2065/actions?KWICView=false [https://perma.cc/42GK-5YVG].
120. Summary: S.2065 – 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last
visited Mar. 13, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/2065 [https://perma.cc/S7L5-ACPU].
121. Id.
122. Deepfake Report Act of 2019, S.2065, 116th Cong. 1st Sess. (2019).
123. S.2065, sec. 3. (a), (c)(2).
124. S.1790 § 5709.
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deepfakes, and related notifications.”125 Within 180 days of the Act’s
passage, the Director of National Intelligence must consult with appropriate
intelligence leaders and develop a report to submit to the congressional
intelligence committees consisting of “the potential national security impact
of machine-manipulated media (commonly known as ‘deepfakes’)” and the
uses of deepfakes by “foreign governments to spread disinformation.”126
Specifically, the report is required to include information about the “technical
abilities” of China and Russia in creating and disseminating deepfakes,
particularly for uses relating to “discrediting political opponents or disfavored
populations . . .”127 The section also requests research about how the United
States could quickly identify and defend against a deepfake attack.128 The bill
was signed into law on December 20, 2019.129 The report from the Director
of National Intelligence, then, is due by June 17, 2020 (180 days after the
Act’s passage). As of November 18, 2020, the report had not been completed
and was still under development.

B. States Are Taking the Matters Into Their Own Hands
States have started the discussion about deepfakes in two ways:
preventing the dissemination of certain sexually explicit deepfakes and
preventing deepfake election tampering. First, some states have tackled
deepfakes when it relates to sexually explicit content.130 For example,
Maryland amended its statute prohibiting child pornography to include
deepfake technology.131
It now prohibits deepfakes that are
“[i]ndistinguishable from an actual and identifiable child” and contain “a
computer-generated image that has been created, adapted, or modified to
appear as an actual and identifiable child.”132 However, the statute expressly
mentions that it does not cover typical parody art forms, such as “drawings,
cartoons[,] sculptures[,] or paintings.”133
Virginia and California amended their revenge porn statutes to penalize
the dissemination of deepfakes if they are used for revenge porn purposes.134
California’s revenge porn statute describes photos and videos that include

125. Id.
126. Id. at § 5709(a)(1).
127. Id. at § 5709(a)(2)(A)–(B).
128. Id. at § 5709(a)(2)(C).
129. All Actions S.1790 — 116th Congress (2019-2020), CONGRESS.GOV (last
visited Mar. 15, 2020), https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senatebill/1790/actions [https://perma.cc/KZ5P-YGGP].
130. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (West 2019); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2020).
131. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208 (West 2019).
132. Id. at § 11-208(a)(2).
133. Id. at § 11-208(a)(3).
134. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-386.2(A) (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86
(West 2020).
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“[c]omputer-generated nude body parts as the nude body parts of the depicted
individual,” and “[t]he depicted individual engaging in sexual conduct in
which the depicted individual did not engage.”135 There are exceptions to
liability under California’s law, for example, if the altered videos are “[a]
matter of legitimate public concern,” “[a] work of political or newsworthy
value or similar work,” or “[c]ommentary, criticism, or disclosure that is
otherwise protected by the California Constitution or the United States
Constitution.”136
Some states have started to regulate deepfakes if they are used to
interfere with elections. California and Texas have both enacted these type of
laws.137 In September 2019, Texas was the first state to take steps to regulate
deepfakes in the election context.138 The amendment of the state’s election
code punishes a person who intends to “injure a candidate or influence the
result of an election” by creating a deepfake video and publishes or distributes
it within 30 days of an election.139 There are no exceptions to the law, which
has garnered some criticism from legal experts about its constitutionality
under the First Amendment.140
Just a month later, California passed legislation that amended the state’s
election code to prohibit deepfakes published “within 60 days of an election”
if they were distributed “with actual malice . . . [and] with the intent to injure
the candidate’s reputation or to deceive a voter into voting for or against the
candidate, unless the media includes a disclosure stating that the media has
been manipulated.”141 The law does not use the term “deepfake” to describe
the “deceptive audio or visual media,” although news outlets have recognized
that was the legislature’s intent in passing the law.142 The law also allows
candidates that are the victims of deceptive deepfakes to sue for injunctive
relief or monetary damages.143 Unlike Texas, the California law includes
exceptions for parody deepfakes and paid-for broadcast advertisements.144

135. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(a)(6)(A)–(C) (West 2020).
136. Id. at § 1708.86(c)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).
137. Shao, supra note 7.
138. Kenneth Artz, Texas Outlaws ‘Deepfakes’—but the Legal System May Not
Be
Able
to
Stop
Them,
LAW.COM
(Oct.
11,
2019),
https://www.law.com/texaslawyer/2019/10/11/texas-outlaws-deepfakes-but-thelegal-system-may-not-be-able-to-stop-them/ [https://perma.cc/YL56-UVNZ].
139. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019).
140. Artz, supra note 138.
141. A.B. 730, 2019-2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (as described in the
Legislative Counsel’s Digest). The law is now codified under CAL. ELEC. CODE §
20010 (West 2019).
142. A.B. 730; Kari Paul, California makes ‘deepfake’ videos illegal, but law may
be hard to enforce, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 7, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2019/oct/07/california-makes-deepfake-videos-illegal-but-law-may-be-hard-toenforce [https://perma.cc/3QKL-BG47].
143. A.B. 730.
144. Id.
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Other states have attempted to cover privacy more generally than just
deepfakes but have not succeeded. For example, New York discussed
legislation that would have made it fraud to create a digital replica of someone
without their consent.145 The intent of this bill was to protect the state’s longstanding “right to publicity.”146 For example, creating a deepfake of an actor
post-mortem would require the deepfaker to get the approval of the late actor’s
estate before using his or her likeness, otherwise the deepfaker would be
criminally liable.147 Similarly, Massachusetts introduced a bill that would
have made the creation of a deepfake with the intent to distribute a crime of
identity fraud.148 Missouri legislators have not passed – let alone introduced
– any laws regulating deepfakes. However, Missourians have not been
completely silent about the issue; the Missouri School of Journalism, for
example, hosted a national collegiate innovation competition which “tasked
teams with developing tools to help verify photos, videos or audio content to
help the industry fight against deepfakes and fabricated content.”149

IV. DISCUSSION
Outside of the world of pornography, the impact of deepfakes on politics
and democracy is perhaps the largest threat.150 Given the previous summary
of how deepfakes have been discussed by governments and the media
nationwide, it is not surprising that deepfakes carry a negative connotation for
a growing American population that feels democracy is threatened by fake
news.151 When attempting to analyze deepfakes under the fabric of the First
Amendment, there are two main categories to divide political deepfakes into:
145. N.Y. Assemb, B. A08155, 2017-2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017). The bill
was not passed through the state Senate. A08155 Actions, NEW YORK STATE
ASSEMBLY
(last
visited
Nov.
25,
2020),
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A08155&term=2017&A
ctions=Y [https://perma.cc/N3SZ-4GRC].
146. A08155 Chamber Transcript, NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY (June 18, 2018),
https://www2.assembly.state.ny.us/write/upload/transcripts/2017/6-1818.html#08155 [].
147. Id.
148. H.3366, 2019-2020 Leg., 191st Sess. (Mass. 2020).
149. Student team wins journalism innovation competition with deepfake fighting
tool, UNIV. OF MO. SYS. (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.umsystem.edu/stories/studentteam-wins-journalism-innovation-competition-deepfake-fighting-tool
[https://perma.cc/TCG4-DTDK].
150. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1778; Shao, supra note 7.
151. See Michael Dimock, An update on our research into trust, facts and
democracy,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(June
5,
2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/2019/06/05/an-update-on-our-research-into-trust-factsand-democracy/ [https://perma.cc/67EJ-UP6E] (“Nearly seven-in-ten (68%) say
made-up news and information greatly affects Americans’ confidence in government
institutions, and roughly half (54%) say it is having a major impact on Americans’
confidence in each other.”).
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(1) those that are made for comedic purposes but have negative consequences,
and (2) those that are designed to spread misinformation and lies.152
Depending on which category the deepfake falls under, the action against it
might differ. For example, deepfakes that are parodies might be handled
through a civil case for libel,153 while a deepfake that was created to dismantle
fair elections might be prosecuted under a statute.154 Regulating deepfakes is
certainly not restricted to this binary, as other avenues have actively been
explored by legislators and scholars alike.155

A. Expanding on Deepfakes as Political Speech and Parodies
If a deepfake teases a political candidate or government official, the
easiest argument that the deepfaker could make in defense of their video is
that it is a form of political speech intended to be a parody. This argument
has already been anticipated – and permitted – by social networking websites,
state statutes, and federal legislation.156 But what if the deepfake is so
convincing that it does not appear to be a parody to the “reasonable person”?
For a parody to really achieve its goal of being humorous, it “requires the
audience recognize both the subject of the parody and the parodist’s mocking
distortions.”157 Perhaps there is a comparison that could be made between a
convincing deepfake and a good impersonation.
Alec Baldwin’s
impersonation of President Donald Trump on Saturday Night Live is a great
example of a parody.158 If Baldwin, during his impersonation of Trump, said

152. For the purpose of the discussion in this Note, the author declines to discuss
pornographic deepfakes and obscenity law and instead will focus on deepfakes as they
pertain to political speech.
153. David Greene, We Don’t Need New Laws for Faked Videos, We Already Have
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Feb.
13,
2018),
Them,
ELECTRONIC
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2018/02/we-dont-need-new-laws-faked-videos-wealready-have-them [https://perma.cc/E2JZ-KRBS].
154. See e.g., TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019).
155. See Edvinas Meskys et al., Regulating deep fakes: legal and ethical
considerations, 15 J. OF INTELL. PROP. L & PRAC. 24, 30–31 (2020); Matthew F.
Ferraro, Deepfake Legislation: A Nationwide Survey—State and Federal Lawmakers
Consider Legislation to Regulate Manipulated Media, WILMERHALE (Sept. 25, 2019),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20190925-deepfakelegislation-a-nationwide-survey [https://perma.cc/A28X-NYR8].
156. See e.g. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(3) (West 2019) (allowing
a parody exception for manipulated child pornography cases); S. 3805 § 1041(d)(2)
(granting a First Amendment exception for prosecution under the Act); Holmes, supra
note 31 (showing that Facebook makes an exception for deepfakes categorizes as
satire).
157. Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward A Coherent
Standard of Parody As Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465, 465–66 (1992).
158. Saturday Night Live, Impeachment Cold Open – SNL, YOUTUBE (Sept. 28,
2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xR25izGfrmQ [https://perma.cc/JH46F96K].
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something nonfactual and defamatory, could Trump bring a claim for libel or
emotional distress against him? Probably not, unless the statement made by
Baldwin was said with “actual malice” and could not reasonably believed to
be a joke.159
Taking it a step further, if a deepfaker took Baldwin’s voice
impersonation and layered it over the top of a deepfake video that looked more
convincingly like Trump, then would Trump have a claim? Maybe –
depending on the context – but still probably not. If the deepfake was very
realistic, maybe the reasonable person might actually believe that Trump said
the falsehoods. Trump, however, would still need to prove that the deepfaker
had “actual malice” behind making the video. The “actual malice” standard
cannot possibly cover all the bases here; after all, it is possible for a deepfake
to mislead audiences without the deepfaker having knowledge or reckless
disregard that the deepfake really contained untruths.160 Maybe the deepfaker
just wanted to innocently make Baldwin’s impression resemble Trump even
more, or maybe the deepfaker truly wanted to confuse people and hurt
Trump’s reputation and sway an election; this would have to be determined
on a case-by-case basis.
For a real-life example, consider the controversy surrounding the “Yes
Men,” a group of pranksters that use parody and satire to comment on political
and social issues. In 2009, The Yes Men published a fake press release that
resembled one from the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which falsely
announced that the Chamber had changed its stance on climate regulation.161
The Yes Men also hosted a faux press conference to accompany the press
release.162 The Chamber of Commerce sued the Yes Men in response,
claiming the fake press release caused public confusion after some news
outlets treated it like it was legitimate.163 Ultimately, the Chamber dropped

159. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 56 (1988).
160. See James Vincent, Facebook’s problems moderating deepfakes will only get
VERGE
(Jan.
15
2020,
12:36
PM),
worse
in
2020,
THE
https://www.theverge.com/2020/1/15/21067220/deepfake-moderation-apps-tools2020-facebook-reddit-social-media (“Facebook said it will remove ‘manipulated
misleading media’ . . . But the company noted that this does not cover “parody or
satire” or misleading edits made using traditional means, like last year’s viral video of
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi supposedly slurring her words.”).
161. The parody press release is still accessible online. U.S. Chamber Supports
Climate
Bill,
THE
YES
PEOPLE
(Oct.
19,
2009),
https://theyesmen.org/project/chamber/fakerelease [https://perma.cc/QP37-2JFF].
162. Anne C. Mulkern, U.S. Chamber Sues Activists Over Climate Stunt, N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
27,
2009),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/gwire/2009/10/27/27greenwire-uschamber-sues-activists-over-climate-stunt-50982.html
[https://perma.cc/J45MUZJS].
163. Id.; Chris Good, The Yes Men Get Sued, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 27, 2009),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/10/the-yes-men-get-sued/29131/
[https://perma.cc/3D8Z-JHVY].
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the lawsuit after it extended on for four years.164 This instance illustrates that
parodies can be highly protected by the First Amendment. Arguing against
parodies for libel claims can be even trickier, especially for public figures
because of the heightened standards of “actual malice.”

B. Deepfakes as a Vessel to Spread Political Misinformation
Outside of deepfakes made by innocent parodies, there is a concern that
deepfake technology could be used to purposely disseminate lies and deceit.165
So far, there are no proven cases of deepfakes being used to interfere with
elections, although there have been some claims that deepfakes have been
used to tamper with international politics.166 As discussed in Part III, there
have been some federal and state attempts to regulate deepfakes to prevent
intrusion into elections.167 However, some of those attempts, while passed
successfully, have come under fire for infringing on individuals’ First
Amendment rights.168
If a deepfake is used to falsely stir up excitement and panic about an
upcoming election, should the First Amendment still protect that speech?
While precedent seems to indicate that it is protected,169 it could be argued
that, under certain circumstances, deceitful speech can have exacerbated
harmful effects to society and should be regulated.170 However, since the
value of deceitful speech is already low,171 if there was a need to block a
harmful deepfake, a court could potentially classify it into one of the existing
First Amendment exceptions – granted it actually fits into the preexisting

164. U.S. Chamber Cries Uncle, Withdraws Lawsuit, THE YES MEN (June 13,
2013), https://theyesmen.org/chambercriesuncle. See also Yes Men Mourn Lawsuit
Withdrawal,
THE
YES
MEN
(last
visited
Mar.
14,
2020),
https://theyesmen.org/lawsuitwithdrawal [https://perma.cc/P349-MR79].
165. See BuzzfeedVideo, You Won’t Believe What Obama Says In This Video!,
YOUTUBE (April 17, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cQ54GDm1eL0
[https://perma.cc/JK49-23BG] (showing a very convincing deepfake of President
Barack Obama, created by Buzzfeed to show how the technology can be used to depict
incorrect information).
166. McFaul, supra note 3; Nic Ker, Is the political aide viral sex video confession
real
or
a
Deepfake?,
MALAYMAIL
(June
12,
2019),
https://www.malaymail.com/news/malaysia/2019/06/12/is-the-political-aide-viralsex-video-confession-real-or-a-deepfake/1761422 [https://perma.cc/G5VB-U4LR]
(describing how a Malaysian cabinet minister was subjected to controversy after an
alleged pornographic deepfake went viral).
167. See TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 255.004 (West 2019); H.R. 3230.
168. See Artz, supra note 138; Ingram, supra note 117.
169. United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 718 (2012).
170. See Helen Norton, (at Least) Thirteen Ways of Looking at Election Lies, 71
OKLA. L. REV. 117, 125–26 (2018).
171. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1791 (“Lies about the source of speech—
whether a public official is actually speaking—do not serve free speech values.”).
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boundaries of one of those exceptions.172 Perhaps the main exception that
would be applied to controversial deepfakes would be the restrictions laid out
for obscenity. Since deepfakes have a background in falsified pornographic
videos, it may not be surprising if a deepfaker tried to sway an election by
releasing a video of a candidate engaged in a sex act.173
Absent some exigent circumstances, the First Amendment will probably
protect the lies spewed from misleading deepfakes, especially if they relate to
politics.174 However, just because the First Amendment protects certain
speech does not mean deepfakes are excluded from private regulations or
bans.175 One solution is to leave the regulation up to private platforms like
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitch since these platforms already have “the most
advanced technologies to detect immoral, illegal or malicious content, flag it
and remove it.”176 But under this model, it is possible that deepfakes could be
regulated more than they normally would be under the First Amendment;
private platforms can completely ban deepfakes from their websites, but under
the First Amendment, it is assumed that an outright ban on deepfakes would
be unconstitutional.177 By leaving this regulation to private companies, the
companies get complete discretion on which deepfakes have value and which
are unacceptable, a role that typically the government plays – especially in
regards to election tampering. However, it is likely these online platforms do
not really want to take on the task of policing this content.178 Although there
is no direct incentive in place encouraging these platforms for remove
deepfakes, there is increasing public pressure for them to regulate it,
particularly after the wave of “fake news” concerns during the 2016 and 2020
election seasons.179

172. Id. (“Some deep fakes will fall into those categories and thus could be subject
to regulation. This includes defamation of private persons, fraud, true threats, and the
imminent-and-likely incitement of violence.”).
173. See Ker, supra note 166 (describing how a Malaysian cabinet minister was
subjected to controversy after an alleged pornographic deepfake went viral).
174. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269–70 (1964).
175. Meskys, supra note 154, at 31.
176. Id.
177. Id.; Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1788–89; see Cole, supra note 30.
178. Olivier Sylvain, KNIGHT FIRST AMEND. INST., DISCRIMINATORY DESIGNS ON
USER DATA (2018), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/discriminatory-designs-userdata [https://perma.cc/7WX3-VN36].
179. McCabe & Alba, supra note 28 (“False information spread furiously on the
platform during the 2016 campaign, leading to widespread criticism of [Facebook].”);
Sam Dean, How Facebook and Twitter plan to handle election day disinformation,
LA TIMES (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-1102/election-day-2020-disinformation-facebook-instagram-twitter-youtube; Chesney
& Citron, supra note 35, at 1795 (“Online platforms already have an incentive to
screen content, thanks to the impact of moral suasion, market dynamics, and political
pressures.”).
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Additionally, while regulation gets its footing, some experts in privacy
and technology have suggested that political campaigns create an eight-step
plan in case a “deepfake emergency” takes place during election season:
1. Issue a statement that the candidate will not knowingly
disseminate fake or manipulated media of opponents and urge
campaign supporters to abide by the same commitment . . . 2.
Get familiar with the terms of service and community
guidelines for social media platforms on this issue, as well as
the processes to report inappropriate content . . . 3. Designate a
team ready to manage an incident . . . 4. Obtain a briefing on
key trends and threats from knowledgeable experts . . . 5.
Conduct an internal red teaming exercise to prepare for the
range of ways a fake could target the candidate or campaign . . .
6. Establish relationships with company officials that will be
helpful during an incident . . . 7. Establish procedures to quickly
access original video and/or audio footage . . . 8. Prepare
contingency web content or templates that could be swiftly used
to counter false claims.180

While these suggestions do not directly regulate deepfakes, they provide
a framework that could help society achieve a better understanding of how
deepfakes operate and how they can be used to skew politics and disrupt the
political process. According to the scholars behind these suggestions, by
campaigns getting ahead of the threat of a “deepfake emergency,” it helps
candidates be on the battle lines, defending truthfulness over falsehoods.181

C. What Happens When Deepfakes Reach Courts?
At the time of this Note, only a few courts have mentioned deepfakes,
and their discussion has been limited to the footnotes of some cases regarding
the technology’s impact on child pornography law.182 Most state statutes
currently addressing deepfakes have mainly focused on preventing tampering
in the political process, but courts will probably see cases involving deepfakes
relating to pornography first.183 When this occurs, courts should look to

180. Katherine Charlet & Danielle Citron, Campaigns Must Prepare for
Deepfakes: This Is What Their Plan Should Look Like, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL
PEACE
(Sept.
5,
2019),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/09/05/campaigns-must-prepare-for-deepfakesthis-is-what-their-plan-should-look-like-pub-79792 [https://perma.cc/RK7A-HH3T].
181. See id. (“A fake video of a candidate saying she prefers Coke to Pepsi is no
big deal, but one where the candidate falsely appears saying or doing something
despicable could endanger the candidacy and the democratic process.”).
182. See In re S.K., 215 A.3d 300, 315 n.22 (2019); United States v. Streett, No.
CR 14-3609 JB, 2020 WL 231688, at *47 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 15, 2020).
183. Robert Chesney & Danielle Citron, 21st Century-Style Truth Decay: Deep
Fakes and the Challenge for Privacy, Free Expression, and National Security, 78 MD.
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comparable revenge porn cases and statutes for guidance.184 Revenge porn
cases can be compared to non-consensual pornographic deepfakes because
both situations usually involve a person who intentionally distributes
pornographic media without the consent of the victim, and the media would
harm the victim’s reputation.185 Following this, it tracks that victims would
likely bring false light privacy tort claims from these circumstances.186
Alternatively, some prosecutors could bring charges against deepfakers if the
content and dissemination of the deepfake fell under applicable revenge porn
statutes.187 In California, for example, a mix of these could be possible since
its revenge porn statute now includes an exception that is very comparable to
the elements laid out in the leading false light privacy case, Time, Inc. v.
Hill.188 Courts should be prepared to hear both of these types of cases,
whether it be a civil or criminal case, and be willing to interpret the applicable
precedent against the challenges brought by deepfake technology discussed in
previous sections, such as parodies and other First Amendment concerns.

V. CONCLUSION
While deepfakes are a new phenomenon, they are quickly gaining
popularity without an end in sight.189 While there can be some innocence in
altering videos for laughs and entertainment,190 deepfake technology brings
new challenges that have not been fully realized.191 Lawmakers are slowly

L. REV. 882, 885–86 (2019) (showing two examples of private individuals that were
sexually exploited by deepfake videos).
184. See Harris, supra note 73, at 119–20 (“Fairly recent nonconsensual
pornography statutes may be the most effective legal recourse against uploaders of
personal deepfakes featuring nonconsenting individuals.”).
185. Russell Spivak, “Deepfakes”: The Newest Way to Commit One of the Oldest
Crimes, 3 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 339, 400 (2019) (“[C]ourts may want to consider
whether non-consensual pornography of any kind, revenge porn or deepfakes, should
be the foundation of a new exception to the First Amendment’s broad protections.”).
186. Harris, supra note 73, at 115.
187. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 11-208(a)(2) (West 2019); VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-386.2 (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86 (West 2019) (showing
some revised revenge porn state statutes that include deepfakes).
188. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1708.86(c)(1)(B)(ii) (West 2019) (showing that “[a] work
of political or newsworthy value or similar work” can be protected); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374, 377 (1967) (holding that when speech relates to matters of public
interest, it is subjected to higher standards before the creator is subject to liability).
189. Meskys, supra note 155, at 24.
190. See Collider Videos, Tom Cruise IMPOSSIBLE BURGER Challenge!
(Deepfake
Parody),
YOUTUBE
(Feb.
28,
2020),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ntnveCh691M [https://perma.cc/579X-U8YJ]
(showing a deepfaked video of Tom Cruise going grocery shopping for the
“Impossible Burger”).
191. See Chesney & Citron, supra note 183, at 885 (“It is unclear who will win
this arms race, but for now the fight is on.”).
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but surely learning more about the technology and its impact on politics and
individual privacy.192 In an age of “fake news,” the need to understand
deepfakes is pressing if we want to ensure trust in democracy and preserve the
need for truth over lies.193 Suppression of deepfake technology may mean
suppression of rights.194 But an absence of regulation leaves the nation
vulnerable to election tampering and political dismantlement.195 In this sense,
the still waters of deepfake technology really do run… well, deep.

192. See, e.g., S.1790 § 5709.
193. Schwartz, supra note 23 (quoting scholar Danielle Citron saying, “I’m
starting to see how a well-timed deep fake could very well disrupt the democratic
process.”).
194. Meskys, supra note 155, at 29 (“Creative deep fakes could be considered a
constitutive part of free speech.”).
195. Chesney & Citron, supra note 35, at 1778.
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